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Stephen P. Garvey*
In Rosemond v. United States, decided this past term, the Court spoke to
the requirements under 18 US. C. § 2for liability as an aider and abettor
to the use or carriage of a firearm during a crime of violence or drug
trafficking crime in violation of 18 US.C. § 924(c). Here I offer my
reading of Rosemond. I hope it will be useful to litigants and lower
courts (and law professors) as they try to understand what the Court said
and didn't say-or maybe should have said differently-as it addressed
Rosemond's arguments.
INTRODUCTION
Justus Rosemond got into a blue Mazda Proteg6. Ronald Joseph got in too.
One got in back. The other got in front. Vashti Perez then drove the two to a park
in Tooele, Utah. The plan was to sell a pound of marijuana. One of the two
prospective buyers got in the back. The deal went bad. The buyer grabbed the pot
and made a run for it along with the other buyer. Joseph drew a 9 millimeter
semiautomatic handgun and fired. Or maybe it was Rosemond. No one could say
for sure. The witnesses disagreed. Perez, Rosemond, and Joseph then gave chase.
But the police pulled them over about a mile away.l
Rosemond was charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). 2 According to the
government, Rosemond, "during and in relation to [a] ... drug trafficking crime[,]
... use[d] or carrie[d] a firearm," thereby violating § 924(c).3 Section 924(c)'s
raison d'&re is of course to encourage those planning on dealing drugs to leave
their guns at home. If they don't, then on top of whatever time they get for the
underlying drug offense, § 924(c) mandates five more years for using or carrying a
gun, seven for brandishing it, and ten for discharging it.
* Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. I thank Joshua Dressier and Sheri Johnson for their
always insightful comments and conversation.
1 Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240, 1243 (2014).
2 Section 924(c) was originally enacted as part of the Gun Control Act of 1968. Congress
has amended it several times over the years and the Supreme Court has decided several cases arising
under it. See Fern L. Kletter, Annotation, Construction and Application of 18 US.C.A. § 924(c),
Prohibiting Use or Carrying of Firearm in Relation to Crime of Violence or Drug-Trafficking Crime
or Possession of Firearm in Furtherance of Such Crimes-United States Supreme Court Cases, 56
A.L.R. FED. 2D 577 (2014).
' 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2012). The predicate offense with which Rosemond was
charged was possession of marijuana in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).
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Because the government's witnesses disagreed as to who fired the gun,
Rosemond was charged as a principal and as an accomplice under
18 U.S.C. § 2(a). The trial court instructed the jury accordingly. The jury
convicted, and the trial court added ten years to Rosemond's sentence.4 The jury's
general verdict didn't reveal whether it found Rosemond guilty as a principal or as
an accomplice. Rosemond appealed, claiming that the court's instructions on
accomplice liability were faulty. The Tenth Circuit affirmed his conviction. 5 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari 6 and reversed. 7 The district court's instructions
misstated the law of complicity as applied to § 924(c).8 Justice Kagan wrote for
the seven-member majority. 9 Justice Alito wrote an opinion concurring in part and
dissenting in part, in which Justice Thomas joined.
Section 2, originally enacted in 1909,0 speaks in general terms." The Court
is obliged to fill in the details. Yet over 100 years later, no one can say with
confidence what precisely the government must show to establish complicity under
§ 2. The Court has through the years gestured in different directions. But I write
not to judge. If thoughtful students of the criminal law disagree over what
complicity law should look like (and they do), 12 the Court's differential gestures
4 For the other counts on which Rosemond was convicted the judge imposed a four-year
sentence.
5 United States v. Rosemond, 695 F.3d 1151, 1156 (10th Cir. 2012).
6 Rosemond v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2734 (2013).
7 Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240, 1252 (2014).
8 Id. at 1251 ("[T]he District Court erred in instructing the jury, because it did not explain
that Rosemond needed advance knowledge of the firearm's presence.").
9 Justice Scalia joined all but footnotes 7 and 8 of the majority opinion. Id at 1240. See
infra notes 20, 47.
1o See Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 18 (1980). The statute was amended in 1948,
and again in 1951. For a helpful discussion of the history of§ 2, as well as the relationship between §
2(a) and § 2(b), see Baruch Weiss, What Were They Thinking?: The Mental States of the Aider and
Abettor and the Causer Under Federal Law, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1341, 1356-62 (2002).
1 When I refer to § 2, t mean to refer more specifically to § 2(a): "Whoever commits an
offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its
commission, is punishable as a principal." 18 U.S.C. § 2(a).
12 The academic literature on complicity includes most prominently the following:
CHRISTOPHER KuTz, COMPLICITY: ETHICS AND LAW FOR A COLLECTIVE AGE 209-35 (2000); K.J.M.
SMITH, A MODERN TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CRIMINAL COMPLICITY (1991); John F. Decker, The
Mental State Requirement for Accomplice Liability in American Criminal Law, 60 S.C. L. REV. 237
(2008); Joshua Dressier, Reassessing the Theoretical Underpinnings of Accomplice Liability: New
Solutions to an Old Problem, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 91 (1985) [hereinafter Dressier, New Solutions];
Joshua Dressier, Reforming Complicity Law: Trivial Assistance as a Lesser Offense, 5 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 427 (2008); R.A. Duff, 'Can I Help You?' Accessorial Liability and the Intention to Assist,
10 LEGAL STUD. 165 (1990); John Gardner, Complicity and Causality, 1 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 127 (2007);
Douglas Husak, Abetting a Crime, 33 LAW & PHIL. 41 (2014); Sanford H. Kadish, Complicity, Cause
and Blame: A Study in the Interpretation of Doctrine, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 323 (1985); Sanford H.
Kadish, Reckless Complicity, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 369 (1997) [hereinafter Kadish,
Reckless Complicity]; Christopher Kutz, Causeless Complicity, I CRIM. L. & PHIL. 289 (2007);
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over the years telling us what it does look like are understandable (but vexing all
the same). Complicity easily confounds.
My aim for now is modest. I offer one reading of the Court's opinion in
Rosemond. I hope it will be useful to litigants and lower courts (and law
professors) as they try to understand what the Court said and didn't say-or maybe
should have said differently-as it addressed Rosemond's arguments.
I. "AN AFFIRMATIVE ACT IN FURTHERANCE OF THE OFFENSE"
The Court's analysis in Rosemond begins with the following: "As at common
law, a person is liable under § 2 for aiding and abetting a crime if (and only if) he
(1) takes an affirmative act in furtherance of that offense, (2) with the intent to
facilitate the offense's commission." 13 The first element states broadly the actus
reus needed to render an actor liable as an accomplice; the second states broadly
the mens rea. Let me refer to an accomplice (or secondary party) as "S" and to a
principal (or primary party) as "P."
Christopher Kutz, The Philosophical Foundations of Complicity Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW 147 (John Deigh & David Dolinko eds., 2011); Michael S. Moore,
Causing, Aiding, and the Superfluity of Accomplice Liability, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 395 (2007); Rollin
M. Perkins, Parties to Crime, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 581 (1941); Paul H. Robinson, Imputed Criminal
Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 609 (1984); Audrey Rogers, Accomplice Liability for Unintentional Crimes:
Remaining Within the Constraints of Intent, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1351 (1998); Francis Bowes Sayre,
Criminal Responsibility for the Acts of Another, 43 HARV. L. REV. 689 (1930); A.P. Simester, The
Mental Element in Complicity, 122 L.Q.R. 578 (2006); Robert Weisberg, Reappraising Complicity, 4
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 217 (2000); Gideon Yaffe, Intending to Aid, 33 LAW & PHIL. 1 (2014)
[hereinafter Yaffe, Intending to Aid]; Gideon Yaffe, Moore on Causing, Acting, and Complicity, 18
LEGAL THEORY 437 (2012); Daniel Yeager, Helping, Doing, and the Grammar of Complicity, 15
CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 25 (1996); Sherif Girgis, Note, The Mens Rea of Accomplice Liability:
Supporting Intentions, 123 YALE L.J. 460 (2013).
For helpful discussions on complicity doctrine outside the United States, see PARTICIPATION IN
CRIME: DOMESTIC AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES (Alan Reed & Michael Bohlander eds., 2013);
Luis Chiesa, Reassessing Professor Dressler's Plea for Complicity Reform: Lessons from Civil
Jurisdictions, 40 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 1 (2014); Markus D. Dubber,
Criminalizing Complicity: A Comparative Analysis, 5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 977 (2007). I'd also
recommend the latest English Law Commission report on complicity. See THE LAW COMMISSION,
PARTICIPATING IN CRIME, Law Com. No. 305 (May 2007) available at
http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/lc305_Participatingin Crime report.pdf.
13 134 S. Ct. at 1245 (citing 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 13.2, at 337
(2d ed. 2003), and Hicks v. United States, 150 U.S. 442, 449 (1893)). Let me make one small
observation about the Court's statement. In many jurisdictions the actus reus for accomplice liability
is not limited to "affirmative act[s]." The failure to perform a legal duty can also suffice. I'd guess
that the Court referred to "affirmative act[s]," not because it wanted to exclude omissions as a basis
for accomplice liability, but rather because the "affirmative act" formulation was (more or less) the
formulation Rosemond himself offered, see Brief for the Petitioner at 13, 28, Rosemond v. United
States, 134 S. Ct. 1240 (2014) (No. 12-895), which formulation the government in turn accepted as a
correct statement of the law. See Brief for the United States at 14, Rosemond v. United States, 134 S.
Ct. 1240 (2014) (No. 12-895).
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Rosemond and the government agreed that the government needed to prove
each of the above elements in order to persuade a jury to convict S as an
accomplice. The problem, according to Rosemond, was that the trial court
misinstructed the jury in his case when it tried to explain how those elements
applied to § 924(c) and thus what the government needed to prove in order to
persuade the jury to convict him as a § 924(c) accomplice. Indeed, Rosemond
argued that the trial court got it wrong on both counts: it misstated both the actus
reus and the mens rea required to convict him of complicity under § 924(c).
Start with the requisite actus reus. Rosemond argued that the jury couldn't
find that he'd taken an "affirmative act in furtherance of' violating § 924(c) as an
accomplice unless it found that he'd taken an affirmative act in furtherance of P's
use or carriage of a gun. It wouldn't be enough for the jury to find that he
provided aid or encouragement to P to violate § 924(c) in any old way: it had to
find that he provided aid or encouragement to P somehow related to the use or
carriage of a gun. For example, it wouldn't be enough for the jury to find that he
promised to drive the car to the park where the deal was to take place. It had to
find that he did something related more directly to the use or carriage of the gun,
like giving P the gun, or giving him bullets for it, or telling P he needed to bring a
gun, and so on.
The Court rejected Rosemond's argument. Complicity law's "established
approach"'14 just didn't require what Rosemond said it did. At first blush
Rosemond's argument does indeed look like a non-starter. If one can ever
confidently appeal to "hornbook law," I would've said that the hombook law of
complicity requires S to aid or encourage P to commit offense p, but it doesn't
require S to aid or encourage P to commit any specific element of p.'5 Moreover,
complicity doesn't demand that the aid or encouragement S provides be anything
more than trivial. Trivial aid will suffice. So too will aid that makes no causal
difference to P's decision to P. 16 Why trivial or non-causal aid should suffice to
established the necessary connection between S's action and P's crime such that
14 134 S. Ct. at 1247.
15 No surprise that the Court cited one early twentieth century and two late nineteenth century
hornbooks in support of the proposition that the "common law imposed aiding and abetting liability
on a person (possessing the requisite intent) who facilitated any part-even though not every part--of
a criminal venture." Id. at 1246.
16 See, e.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 30.05[2][a], at 468 (6th ed.
2012) ("A secondary party is accountable for the conduct of the primary party even if his assistance
was causally unnecessary to the commission of the offense."); A.P. SIMESTER ET AL., SIMESTER AND
SULLIVAN'S CRIMINAL LAW: THEORY AND DOCTRINE § 7.4(ii), at 213 (5th ed. 2013) ("Although
causation need not be shown, a sufficient degree of connection between S's conduct and the actus
reus of P's offense must be proved."). Not everyone of course agrees that causation (in one sense or
another) should be irrelevant to the law of complicity. See, e.g., Gardner, supra note 12, at 128
(arguing that accomplices and principals both make a causal difference to wrongdoing but differ in
the "types of causal contribution they make"); Dressier, New Solutions, supra note 12, at 124-25
(proposing that complicity law should distinguish between causal and non-causal accomplices such
that the former are liable to greater punishment than the latter).
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P's crime can be imputed to S is theoretically elusive, but the doctrine is what it is.
S must do something to aid or encourage P, but he needn't do much.
But if Rosemond's actus reus argument was so far afield, why bother making
it in the first place? I suspect the answer is simple: Because a number of lower
courts had embraced it. 7 But why? Why would they subscribe to an argument
whose premise hornbook law nips in the bud? What's going on? When all is said
and done, my guess would be that the answer is to be found, not in the structure of
complicity law, but in the structure of § 924(c).
Remember that § 924(c) makes it a crime to use or carry a gun during the
commission of another crime. A defendant charged with aiding and abetting a §
924(c) violation could thus be charged with aiding and abetting two separate
crimes: the predicate crime of violence or drug trafficking crime and the § 924(c)
violation. The predicate offense consists of all the elements that make it up. The §
924(c) violation (one might think) consists of a single element: using or carrying a
firearm. The conclusion follows: an accomplice to a § 924(c) violation must take
an affirmative act to aid or encourage P's use or carriage of a firearm. If he
doesn't, if he only acts to aid or encourage the predicate offense, then he might be
an accomplice to the predicate, but not to a § 924(c) violation.' 8 Or so Rosemond
argued and several courts of appeals had held.
The Court saw things differently. A § 924(c) predicate offense consists of all
the elements that make it up. But § 924(c) isn't a one-element crime. A § 924(c)
violation consists of all the elements that make up the predicate and the use-or-
carry element.1 9 Rosemond's actus reus argument depended on portraying §
924(c)'s use-or-carry element as a crime unto itself, such that he could be liable as
17 See Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 13, at 33-35 (collecting and discussing cases); Tyler
B. Robinson, Note, A Question of Intent: Aiding and Abetting Law and the Rule of Accomplice
Liability Under § 924(c), 96 MICH. L. REV. 783, 786 (1997).
18 Or perhaps the lower courts in question understood § 924(c) to constitute a single crime but
nonetheless believed its use-or-carry element warranted special treatment insofar as a jury finding
that a firearm was used or carried would mean an additional term of imprisonment ranging from five
to ten years on top of the punishment already assigned to the predicate offense. The government
should therefore be required to prove that a § 924(c) accomplice aided or encouraged not only the
predicate offense but the use-or-carry element as well. If you regard § 924(c)'s add-on punishment as
disproportionate or otherwise unwarranted, you might be sympathetic to such an analysis if only
because it narrows § 924(c)'s scope. Sympathy aside, I see no more support in existing doctrine for
this analysis than I do for the analysis described in the text.
19 Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240, 1247 (2014).
Rosemond . . . could assist in § 924(c)'s violation by facilitating either the drug
transaction or the firearm use (or of course both). In helping to bring about one part of
the offense (whether trafficking drugs or using a gun), he necessarily helped to complete
the whole. And that ends the analysis as to his conduct. It is inconsequential, as courts
applying both the common law and § 2 have held, that his acts did not advance each
element of the offense; all that matters is that they facilitated one component.
Id. at 1247.
The Court described § 924(c) as a "combination crime," i.e., one crime consisting of the
elements of the predicate offense combined with the use-or-carry element. See id. at 1248.
2014]
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a § 924(c) accomplice only if he aided or encouraged P's commission of that
single-element crime, i.e., only if he did something to aid or encourage P's use or
carriage of a gun. But once § 924(c) is portrayed as one crime-once the use or
carriage of a gun becomes just one element among others-the premise upon
which Rosemond built his actus reus argument disappears. Once § 924(c) is
understood as a single crime with multiple elements, all that remained to dispatch
the argument was to apply complicity law's "established approach," according to
which aiding or encouraging any element is good enough. 20
II. "WITH THE INTENT TO FACILITATE THE OFFENSE'S COMMISSION"
Rosemond's move from actus reus to mens rea put him on firmer doctrinal
ground. Rosemond and the government agreed that complicity under § 2 required
the government to prove that S acted "with the intent to facilitate the offense's
commission."'', Disagreement set in thereafter.
A. Purpose or Knowledge?
Rosemond argued that in order to prove he acted with the intent to facilitate a
§ 924(c) violation the government had to prove that he wanted P to use or carry a
gun during the predicate offense, not merely that he realized P was or would be
using or carrying one. In the language of the Model Penal Code, Rosemond
20 Because any P who commits a § 924(c) offense necessarily commits a § 924(c) predicate
offense, the so-called "natural and probable consequences" doctrine would (if applied) hold any S
who was an accomplice to P's § 924(c) predicate offense liable for his § 924(c) offense provided the
§ 924(c) offense was a natural and probable consequence of the § 924(c) predicate offense. See
LAFAVE, supra note 13, § 13.3(b), at 361 ("The established rule, as it is usually stated by courts and
commentators, is that accomplice liability extends to acts of the principal in the first degree which
were a 'natural and probable consequence' of the criminal scheme the accomplice encouraged or
aided."); Weiss, supra note 10, at 1427-32 (describing lower court decisions relying in one way or
another on the natural and probable consequences doctrine to analyze challenges to convictions under
§ 924(c)).
The Rosemond majority expressed "no view" on whether the "natural and probable
consequence" doctrine constitutes "an exception to the general rule" that "intent must go to the
specific and entire crime charged" because "no one contends that a § 924(c) violation is a natural and
probable consequence of simple drug trafficking." 134 S. Ct. at 1248 n.7. This language can be read
in at least two ways. It might mean that none of the parties contended that a § 924(c) violation is a
natural and probable consequence of the simple drug trafficking charge involved in Rosemond's case.
Or it might mean (more broadly) that no one could reasonably contend that a § 924(c) violation is a
natural and probable consequence of any simple drug trafficking offense.
Justice Scalia withheld his consent from footnote 7, as he did from footnote 8. I'm guessing he
abstained from footnote 7 either because he worried it might erroneously be construed as a wholesale
rejection of the natural and probable consequences doctrine, or because he believed one could
(depending on the facts) content that a § 924(c) violation is a natural and probable consequence of
simple drug trafficking.
21 Rosemond, 134 S. Ct. at 1245.
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argued that the government had to prove that when he aided or encouraged P his
purpose was for P to use or carry a gun, and not merely that he knew P was or
would do so. 22  The government insisted to the contrary that knowledge was
enough.
Rosemond supported his argument with Judge Learned Hand's canonical
statement on the mens rea required for complicity set forth in United States v.
Peoni.23 Peoni sold counterfeit bills to a fellow named Regno, who sold them in
turn to Dorsey. "The question [was] whether Peoni was guilty as an accessory to
Dorsey's possession. 2 4 After reciting several "definitions" touching on the actus
reus of complicity,2 5 Judge Hand pronounced:
It will be observed that all these definitions have nothing whatever
to with the probability that the forbidden result would follow upon the
accessory's conduct; and that they all demand that he in some sort
associate himself with the venture, that he participate in it as in
something he wishes to bring about, that he seek by his action to make it
succeed. All the words used--even the most colorless "abet"--carry an
implication of purposive attitude toward it.
2 6
22 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a) (1985). I should note for the record that the MPC defines
"purposely" in one way when the element with respect to which that kind of culpability applies is a
"nature of... conduct or a result" element and in another way when the element is an "attendant
circumstance" element. Compare § 2.02(2)(a)(i), with § 2.02(2)(a)(ii). I should also note that the
MPC defines "purposely" as to an attendant circumstance element and "knowingly" as to an
attendant circumstance element in a similar (but not identical) way. Compare § 2.02(2)(a)(ii), with §
2.02(2)(b)(i).
23 United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1938). For reasons not entirely clear to me,
courts (including the Supreme Court in Rosemond) and commentators routinely describe the language
in Judge Hand's Peoni opinion as "canonical." But why Peoni enjoys that status (beyond so often
being so declared) is puzzling. The opinion takes up only three pages in the Federal Reporter, its
statement of the facts raises as many questions as it answers, and precisely what it holds is subject to
reasonable disagreement. On the last point, see, for example, Weiss, supra note 10, at 1424
(Contrary to the conventional wisdom, "Peoni is not an ordinary aiding and abetting case. Rather, it
is a 'natural and probable consequences" case that does not even purport to determine the mental
state of the aider and abettor."); Yaffe, Intending to Aid, supra note 12, at 2 ("Federal courts in the
United States, and many state courts as well, have done an admirable job since [Peoni was decided]
of pretending as though they know exactly what Hand meant."). I'd guess that Judge Hand's
reputation, together with the power of repetition, has something (maybe a lot) to do with it.
24 Peoni, 100 F.2d at 401 (emphasis added). The question more specifically was whether
Peoni was an accomplice to the crimes Dorsey committed, i.e., "counterfeiting national bank notes"
(codified in 1938 at 18 U.S.C. § 263) and "uttering forged obligations" (codified in 1938 as 18 U.S.C.
§ 265). See id. at 401-02.
25 Although it seems little remarked upon, Judge Hand's opinion purports to extract an
account of complicity's mens rea requirement from its actus reus requirement.
26 Peoni, 100 F.2d at 402.
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Under this rule, Judge Hand continued, "Peoni was not an accessory to
Dorsey's possession; ... it was of no moment to him whether Regno passed [the
bills] himself, and so ended the possibility of further guilty possession, or whether
he sold them to a second possible passer., 27 Peoni wasn't liable as an accomplice
to Dorsey's possession unless he wanted Dorsey to come into possession of the
counterfeit bills, but Peoni didn't care one way or the other what Regno did with
them.
As Rosemond construed this language (language the government also
embraced), S could be liable as an accomplice under § 2 only if the government
proved that when he rendered aid he wanted P to commit crime p, or in other
words, that his purpose was for P to commit that crime. In order to prove liability
as an accomplice to a § 924(c) violation under Peoni, the government would thus
need to show that S wanted P to use or carry a firearm. Rosemond claimed that the
judge's instruction to the jury in his case nowhere made this requirement clear to
the jury. He therefore deserved a new trial.
The Court agreed with Rosemond that Peoni's statement of the law was
indeed "the canonical formulation of . . . [the] state of mind" needed for
accomplice liability under § 2, '28 noting that the Court itself had "appropriated" it
in later cases. 29 The Court also noted that the intent required to hold S liable as an
accomplice "must go to the specific and entire crime charged-so here, to the full
scope (predicate crime plus gun use) of § 924(c). 3 ° On one plausible reading the
Court is here saying that liability as an accomplice under § 2 requires the
government to prove that when S rendered aid or encouragement he intended P to
commit crime p, where intent is limited to purpose (pursuant to Peoni) and where
purpose must extend to each of p's material elements (pursuant to the Court's
observation that "intent must go to the specific and entire crime charged").
So Rosemond wins, right? Nope. In the very next paragraph the Court says:
"We have previously found that intent requirement [i.e., the mens rea requirement
described in Peoni] satisfied when a person actively participates in a criminal
venture with full knowledge of the circumstances constituting the charged
offense., 31 After describing the cases in which the Court had "previously [so]
found, 3 2 as well as the holding of "several Courts of Appeals ... that the unarmed
driver of a getaway car had the requisite intent to aid and abet armed bank robbery
if he 'knew' that his confederates would use weapons," the Court concluded: "So
for purposes of aiding and abetting law, a person who actively participates in a
27 Id. at 402-03.
28 Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240, 1248 (2014) (emphasis added).
29 See, e.g., Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 619 (1949) (quoting Peoni, 100
F.2d at 402).
30 Rosemond, 134 S. Ct. at 1248 (emphasis added).
31 Id. (emphasis added).
32 Id. at 1249 (citing Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1 (1954), and Bozza v. United States,
330 U.S. 160 (1947)).
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criminal scheme knowing its extent and character intends that scheme's
commission. 33
Is the Court now saying that liability as an accomplice under § 2 requires the
government to prove that when S rendered aid or encouragement he intended P to
commit crime p, where intent includes knowledge (pursuant to the cases in which
the Court had previously found knowledge to suffice), and where such knowledge
must extend to each of p's material elements? So it would seem. Indeed, the
Court states its holding (at the outset of the opinion) thus:
[W]hen [the Government] accuses a defendant of aiding or abetting [a
violation of § 924(c)] .... [w]e hold that the Government makes its case
by proving that the defendant actively participated in the underlying drug
trafficking or violent crime with advance knowledge that a confederate
would use or carry a gun during the crime's commission.34
The Court's jurisprudence on the mental state or states required for
accomplice liability under § 2 is no model of clarity, and Rosemond looks as if it
does little to improve that state of affairs.35 On the one hand, the Court calls
Peoni's embrace of purpose as the mental state required for accomplice liability
"canonical." On the other hand, the Court's holding embraces knowledge as
sufficient.
But perhaps the rule in Peoni and the Court's holding in Rosemond can be
reconciled. Let me offer three strategies for doing so. Each narrows the scope of
the Peoni rule, thereby rendering it consistent with Rosemond's holding. The first
relies on a distinction between conduct elements and circumstance elements; the
second on a distinction between "non-aggravating" elements and "aggravating"
elements; and the third on a distinction between "active participants" and
"incidental facilitators."
33 id.
34 Id. at 1243 (emphasis added). Rory Little understands Rosemond's "bottom (if not
uncomplicated) line" to be: "[A] criminal helper must have 'foreknowledge' of all the elements of the crime he
is charged with." Rory Little, Opinion Analysis: Justice Kagan Writes a Primer on Aiding andAbetting Law,
SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 6, 2014, 9:04 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/03/opinion-analysis-justice-
kagan-writes-a-primer-on-aiding-and-abetting-law/.
35 Justice Alito put the point mildly when he said that "some tension" exists in the Court's
"case law on the mens rea required to establish aiding and abetting." 134 S. Ct. at 1253 (Alito, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Having noted the tension, Justice Alito went on to say that
"because the difference between acting purposely (when that concept is properly understood) and
acting knowingly is slight, this [tension] is not a matter of great concern." Id. I have to differ, at
least insofar the distinction is alleged to be analytically "not a matter of great concern." Suffice it to
say that the distinction forms part of the Model Penal Code's much-regarded hierarchy of kinds of
culpability, not to mention being at the heart of the long-standing debate over what is or should be the
mens rea required for accomplice liability.
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1. Conduct Elements and Circumstance Elements
Statements describing the mens rea required for accomplice liability often
assume that one mental state applies to the entire offense Y from which S derives
liability. Witness the Court's statement in Rosemond: "[A] person is liable under §
2 for aiding and abetting a crime if (and only if) he (1) takes an affirmative act in
furtherance of that offense (2) with the intent of facilitating the offense's
commission." The mens rea for complicity is thus portrayed as a single mental
state ("intent") the object of which is a single offense (p ("the offense").
But that analysis ignores that fact that P's offense (p consists of different
elements. We can break p down into its conduct elements, result elements (if any),
and attendant-circumstances elements.36 We can then ask what, if any, mental
state the law of complicity does (or should) require S to possess as to each of (p's
elements at the time he provides P with aid or encouragement.
Peoni is widely understood to require purpose with respect to (. But does
Peoni's insistence on purpose apply to all p's elements? If so, then Rosemond's
holding is inconsistent with Peoni. Peoni would have required the government to
prove (as Rosemond said) that S wanted (i.e., that it was his purpose) at the time he
helped P for P to use or carry a gun, but the Court held that the government need
only prove that S knew P was or would be using or carrying a gun.
But suppose Peoni doesn't require S's purpose to be that each of (p's elements
obtain when he helps P. Suppose Peoni requires that S wanted P to perform the
conduct constitutive of (p-ing, but so far as the other elements of Y are concerned,
i.e., p's result and circumstance elements, Peoni requires only that S have had
whatever mental states he would've had to have had if he'd been charged as a
principal. S must want P to engage in the conduct constitutive of p, but S
otherwise need only possess whatever mental state or states (if any) that p itself
attaches to its various result and attendant circumstance elements.38
36 For a persuasive argument to the effect that the MPC's analytical framework should include
ulterior mens rea elements (e.g., specific intent elements) as a separate category, see J.J. Child, The
Structure, Coherence and Limits of Inchoate Liability: The New Ulterior Element, 34 LEGAL STUD.
537 (forthcoming Dec. 2014) available at
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/store/10.1111/lest. 12026/asset/lest 12026.pdf?v=l &t-i 12kcdse&s=72a
6ff254372886652476a152247f20b465bc1 I e.
37 See, e.g., LAFAVE, supra note 20, § 13.2(e), at 352 ("[T]he Peoni rule is today generally
accepted to mean that one does not become an accomplice by an intentional act of assistance or
encouragement merely because he knows that such act will facilitate a crime.").
38 Construed in this way, the Peoni rule comes close to the Model Penal Code's rule on the
mens rea for complicity. Section 2.06 of the Code is commonly interpreted to require S to have as
his purpose that P perform the conduct constituting the offense (D to be imputed to S and to have
whatever mental state (p otherwise requires as to its result elements. The mental state S must have
toward w's attendant circumstance elements is left to "resolution by the courts." MODEL PENAL CODE
AND COMMENTARIES § 2.06 cmt. 6(b), at 311 n.37 (1985). Two of the most able students of the
Model Penal Code have nonetheless maintained that the "policy arguments against elevation of
culpability as to a result element are equally applicable to circumstance elements." PAUL H.
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Now suppose we characterize § 924(c)'s "use or carry" element as an
attendant circumstance. One might say that the conduct constituting a § 924(c)
violation is the conduct constituting its predicate offense, and one circumstance
attending that conduct must be the use or carriage of a firearm. Suppose too that a
defendant can be convicted as a principal for violating § 924(c) as long as he knew
he was using or carrying a gun.39 It would thus suffice for liability as a § 924(c)
accomplice for S to have known that P was or would be carrying a firearm.
Peoni's rule and Rosemond's holding are thus happily reconciled.4°
The problem with this strategy is its premise. It can bring Peoni and
Rosemond into harmony only if "us[ing] or carr[ying] a firearm" can fairly be
characterized as an attendant circumstance. But I doubt it can be. Insofar as it
describes something an actor does, the "us[ing] or carry[ing]" element is better
characterized as a conduct element. Or maybe even better as part conduct and part
attendant circumstance. The actor must do something with something, where the
something done is "us[ing] or carr[ying]" (conduct), and where the something used
or carried is a "firearm" (attendant circumstance). 41 Anyhow, describing the use-
or-carry element as an attendant circumstance simpliciter just doesn't fit, and if it
doesn't fit, the distinction between conduct and circumstance elements can't put
Peoni and Rosemond together again.42
ROBINSON & MICHAEL T. CAHILL, CRIMINAL LAW 244 (2d ed. 2012). For a contrary argument to the
effect that the "mens rea standard of the completed crime is not relevant to the mens rea standard of
complicity," see Yaffe, Intending to Aid, supra note 12, at 30.
39 See Weiss, supra note 10, at 1383 n.195 (collecting lower court cases in support of this
supposition).
40 Limiting Peoni's purpose requirement such that it extends only to p's conduct elements
would appear consistent with Peoni's facts (my understanding of which is limited to the description
provided in Judge Hand's opinion). Even if we assume that Peoni somehow aided or encouraged
Dorsey's possession when he sold the counterfeit bills to Regno, the government couldn't prove he
did so wanting Dorsey to do whatever he needed to do to come into possession of the bills, i.e., the
government couldn't prove that Peoni's purpose at that time was for Dorsey to perform the conduct
constituting the crime of possessing counterfeit bills.
41 How best to characterize § 924(c)'s "uses or carries a firearm" element within the MPC's
analytical framework is of course one example of a more general problem. For the classic discussion
of the problem and a proposed fix, see Paul H. Robinson & Jane A. Grail, Element Analysis in
Defining Criminal Liability: The Model Penal Code and Beyond, 35 STAN. L. REV. 681, 706-09,
719-25 (1983).
42 Although I have difficulty seeing how § 924(c)'s "use or carries" element could on the
merits be characterized as a circumstance element, I can see how one might be inclined to suggest
that it should be so characterized "in an effort to justify Rosemond's holding," Kit Kinports,
Rosemond, Mens Rea, and the Elements of Complicity, 52 SAN DIEGO L. REV. (forthcoming 2015)
(manuscript at 33), i.e., in an effort to read Rosemond in such a way that its holding is consistent with
Peoni's rule.
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2. "Aggravating" Elements and "Non-Aggravating" Elements
In response to Rosemond's claim that the government should be obliged to
prove that his purpose was for P to use or carry a gun, the Court said:
What matters for purposes of gauging intent ... is that the defendant has
chosen, with full knowledge, to participate in the illegal scheme-not
that, if all had been left to him, he would have planned the identical
crime .... The law does not, nor should it, care whether he participates
with a happy heart or a sense of foreboding. Either way he has
knowingly elected to aid in the commission of a peculiarly risky form of
offense.
In the next paragraph the Court adds:
A final, metaphorical way of making the point: By virtue of §
924(c), using a firearm at a drug deal ups the ante. A would-be
accomplice might decide to play at those perilous stakes. Or he might
grasp that the better course would be to fold his hand. What he should
not expect is the capacity to hedge his bets, joining in a dangerous
criminal scheme but evading its penalties by leaving use of the gun to
someone else. Aiding and abetting law prevents that outcome, so long as
the player knew the heightened stakes when he decided to stay in the
game.44
These passages suggest another way to reconcile Peoni's rule with
Rosemond's holding. An accomplice to P's § 924(c) predicate offense has chosen
to "play the game." He wants P to commit a crime. Having so chosen, he forfeits
(or so one could argue) any standing he might otherwise have had to complain that
the game is not exactly the one he wanted to play, i.e., that P commits the predicate
offense with a gun when S would have preferred P to leave the gun behind.
Having acted with the purpose that P commit the predicate offense, S lacks
standing to complain when P commits not only the § 924(c) predicate offense but
the § 924(c) violation as well, at least if S realized P was or would be using or
45carrying a gun.
43 Rosemond, 134 S. Ct. at 1250.
44 id.
45 Although the Court refused to endorse or reject the natural and probable consequences
doctrine, see supra note 20, that doctrine is (I would argue) rooted in the same general principle upon
which the Court built its argument for rejecting Rosemond's claim that purpose should apply to the
use-or-carry element: An actor liable for one wrong forfeits some ground or another upon which to
complain that he is being held accountable for another or greater wrong resulting therefrom. The
natural and probable consequences doctrine and the Court's argument are (so far as I can tell) both
children of the canon law doctrine .'versari in re illicita imputantur omnia quae sequuntur ex
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Here is another way to put the point. The use or carriage of a gun aggravates
and transforms a § 924(c) predicate offense into a § 924(c) violation. When P
violates § 924(c), S has no standing to complain if the law holds him accountable
for that offense, provided S wanted P to commit the predicate offense and believed
that P was or would be using or carrying a gun during its commission. If we limit
Peoni's purpose requirement to non-aggravating elements of offense (p, but permit
knowledge to suffice as to any aggravating elements, then Peoni's rule would no
longer conflict with Rosemond's holding. Purpose would apply to all of § 924(c)'s
non-aggravating elements, but knowledge would suffice for § 924(c)'s aggravating
use-or-carry element. Rosemond's holding would thus keep faith with Peoni's
rule.
3. "Active Participants" and "Incidental Facilitators"
Here once again is the Court's statement of its holding: "We hold that the
Government makes its case [against a defendant as a § 924(c) accomplice] by
proving that the defendant actively participated in the underlying drug trafficking
or violent crime with the advance knowledge that a confederate would use or carry
a gun during the crime's commission., 46 One might imagine that when the Court
said that a § 924(c) accomplice must "actively participate[]" in the predicate
offense it meant only that he must satisfy complicity's traditional actus reus
requirement.
That reading would be plausible---except for footnote 8. 4 7 Having stated as a
general proposition that "for purposes of aiding and abetting law, a person who
actively participates in a criminal scheme knowing its extent and character intends
that scheme's commission," the Court appended the following footnote:
delicto.' (One who traffics in the illicit is responsible for all wrongs that ensure)." Kadish, Reckless
Complicity, supra note 12, at 376 n.19.
Indeed, the logic of the Court's argument in the passage cited in the text could be extended
further than the Court allows. Once S has decided to "play the game," i.e., once he has aided or
encouraged P to commit the § 924(c) predicate with the purpose that P commit that predicate, why
should it matter whether or not he knows P is or will be using or carrying a gun? Why not say: "You
decided to play the game. You didn't know the game involved a gun? Sorry. You should have
known, even if you didn't." I'm not endorsing this line of thought. I mention it only to suggest that
the Court's response to Rosemond's plea for purpose bears at least a family resemblance to the
natural and probable consequences doctrine on which it "express[ed] no view," Rosemond, 134 S. Ct.
at 1248 n.7, and that the Court failed to explain why it limited the logic of its argument in the way it
did.
46 Rosemond, 134 S. Ct. at 1243 (emphasis added).
47 Footnote 8 was the other footnote Justice Scalia refused to join. I'd guess once again that
he didn't want to be on record as supporting what could become a new branch of jurisprudence under
§ 2 distinguishing between "active participants" and "incidental facilitators." Moreover, he may have
detected nothing in the language of § 2 to support any such distinction.
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We did not deal in these cases [i.e., the cases the Court cited in
support of the above-mentioned general proposition], nor do we here,
with defendants who incidentally facilitate a criminal venture rather than
actively participate in it. A hypothetical case is the owner of a gun store
who sells a firearm to a criminal, knowing but not caring how the gun
will be used. We express no view about what sort of facts, if any, would
suffice to show that such a third party has the intent necessary to be
convicted of aiding and abetting.48
Footnote 8 "express[ed] no view" on what "sort of facts" it would take to
render "an incidental facilitator" liable as an accomplice. But the implication is
hard to miss. If S was an "active participant," then knowingly facilitating P's
commission of offense T will suffice to render S liable as an accomplice, but if S
was a (mere) "incidental facilitator," then he can't be liable as an accomplice
unless when he (incidentally) aided or encouraged P his purpose in so doing was
for P to commit offense p. The mens rea required to render S complicit would
thus depend on his actus reus: a smaller actus reus demands a larger mens rea.
Knowledge is enough to nab the active participant, but purpose is needed to pinch
the incidental facilitator.49
Recall that Peoni sold counterfeit bills to Regno, who in turn sold them to
Dorsey. Peoni was charged as an accomplice to Dorsey's possession (not
Regno's). Peoni's connection to Dorsey was once removed. Peoni looks more
like the gun dealer in the Court's hypothetical than he does Rosemond.50
Rosemond was an "active participant" in P's violation of § 924(c). He got in the
car, drove to the park, and was present throughout the deal, presumably ready to
lend a helping hand if needed. If Peoni can fairly be characterized as an incidental
facilitator, Peoni's purpose requirement might be limited to accomplices within
that class. If so, then once again, Peoni and Rosemond can happily co-exist. Peoni
48 134 S. Ct. at 1249 n.8 (emphasis added).
49 The distinction between active participants and incidental facilitators is of course
reminiscent of another distinction that has been proposed in an effort to reform complicity law: the
distinction between substantial and trivial aid. Trivial aid requires more mens rea; substantial aid
requires less. Indeed, if a participant qualifies as "active" insofar as the aid he provides is substantial,
and if a facilitator qualifies as "incidental" insofar as the aid he provides is trivial, then the distinction
between substantial and trivial aid maps onto the distinction between the active participants and
incidental facilitators. Yet insofar as the distinction between substantial and trivial aid is a proposal
to reforming complicity law, I have a hard time seeing how it could be said that any such distinction
is part of the law of § 2, inasmuch as § 2 "must be read 'against its common-law background."'
Limelight Networks v. Akamai Technologies, 134 S. Ct. 2111, 2119 (2014) (citing Standefer v.
United States, 447 U.S. 10, 19 (1980)).
Another common proposal would link the requisite mens rea to the seriousness of P's crime. If
P's crime were sufficiently serious (like murder), it would suffice to make S an accomplice if he
provided aid or encouragement knowing what P had in mind; otherwise, purpose would be needed.




involved an incidental facilitator for whom liability as an accomplice requires
purpose. Rosemond was an active participant for whom knowledge suffices. 5
B. Failure of Proof or Affirmative Defense?
The final issue is the one on which the majority and Justice Alito parted ways.
Recall the Court's holding one last time: "We hold that the Government makes its
case [against a defendant as a § 924(c) accomplice] by proving that the defendant
actively participated in the underlying drug trafficking or violent crime with the
advance knowledge that a confederate would use or carry a gun during the crime's
commission. 52 I've so far ignored the Court's insistence that S's knowledge be
"advance" knowledge. Let me turn to it now.
What does the Court mean by "advance knowledge"? You might image it
means that S isn't liable as a § 924(c) accomplice unless the government can prove
that S realized P would be carrying a gun before P starts to commit the predicate
offense. But that wouldn't be right. As Justice Alito observed, S has "advance"
knowledge (per the majority) if he first learned that P was using or carrying a gun
during the predicate offense, and if he "realistically could have opted out of the
crime" but didn't.53 He lacks such knowledge if he first learned that P was using
or carrying a gun during the predicate offense but lacked a realistic opportunity to
opt out.
Yet why insist on "advance" knowledge at all? The case of the unwitting S
holds the answer. Imagine an S who aids P in the commission of a drug-
trafficking offense and wholeheartedly wants P to commit that crime. What he
doesn 't want is for P to commit that crime with a gun. Indeed, imagine P assures S
that he'll leave his gun at home. But (of course) he brings it with him anyway, and
S realizes P is packing only in the midst of the deal. What's S to do? If he backs
out he might get killed. If he carries on someone else might get killed. S
calculates that the wiser course of action is to play along. He thus continues to
provide aid knowing that P is carrying a gun. Is our unwitting S a § 924(c)
accomplice?
The majority and Justice Alito each believed that the unwitting S should have
some way to try to escape liability. The majority relied on its advance-knowledge
requirement (and thus on a failure of proof "defense") to supply the needed relief.
Justice Alito would have relied on necessity or duress (and thus on an affirmative
defense) to supply it. I want to suggest that the two sides are really talking past
one another. Justice Alito misunderstands the majority's logic (because the
51 Peoni's involvement with Regno's offense would probably amount to active participation:
Peoni was the one who sold him the fake bills (whether or not Peoni ever had possession of the bills
himself). But the Peoni court never addressed the mens rea required to hold Peoni liable for Regno's
illicit possession, although the opinion can fairly be read to at least leave open the possibility that
knowledge would have been enough. See United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401,403 (2d Cir. 1938).
52 Rosemond, 134 S. Ct. at 1243 (emphasis added).
13 Id. at 1253 n.1 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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majority muddles it) and so concludes that an affirmative defense is the only way
out for the unwitting S.54
Begin with the majority's failure of proof defense. How does the majority
imagine an unwitting S might save his skin? According to the majority:
In such a circumstance [as an unwitting S finds himself], a jury is entitled
to find that the defendant intended only a drug sale-that he never
intended to facilitate, and so does not bear responsibility for, a drug deal
carried out with a gun. A defendant manifests that greater intent, and
incurs the greater liability of § 924(c), when he chooses to participate in
a drug transaction knowing it will involve a firearm; but he makes no
such choice when that knowledge comes too late for him reasonably to
act upon it. 55
What's the majority trying to say in this passage? Here are two possibilities.
It might be saying a jury can find that an unsuspecting S lacks a mental state
required to make him a § 924(c) accomplice inasmuch as he didn't want P to be
armed even though he continued to provide aid after learning that P was armed.
But the majority says earlier in its opinion that S is liable as a § 924(c) accomplice
as long as he knows that P is armed. This reading would therefore render the
majority opinion internally incoherent. 56
On a more charitable reading, the majority is saying that the unwitting S is
indeed liable all else being equal if he continues to provide aid once he realizes
that P is armed. But if S learns that P is armed for the first time in the middle of
the deal, then all else may not be equal. The unwitting S might continue to provide
aid if he sees no realistic way out. He might believe that his continued
participation is the best (but not only) way to ensure that no one gets hurt. But
54 Justice Alito's rhetoric got overheated here. He described the majority's opinion as an
"unprecedented alteration of the law of aiding and abetting . . . [or] of the law of intentionality
generally," and as a "radical step" that "fundamentally alters the prior understanding of mental states
that form the foundation of the substantive criminal law." Id. at 1253, 1254 (Alito, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). I have my doubts.
"5 Id. at 125 1.
56 If I understand him correctly, Justice Alito construed the majority in this way when he said:
[T]he Court, having refrained on pages 1248-49 of its opinion from deciding whether
aiding and abetting requires purposeful, as opposed to knowing conduct, quickly and
without explanation jettisons the "knowing" standard and concludes that purposeful
conduct is needed. This is a critical move because if it is enough for an alleged aider and
abettor simply to know that his confederate is carrying a gun, then the alleged aider and
abettor in he Court's hypothetical case (who spots the gun on the confederate's person)
unquestionably had the mens rea needed for conviction.
Id. at 1254-55 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
57 The majority missed the important difference between an unwitting S who believes his
continued participation is the best way to avoid a greater harm and the unwitting S who believes his
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once he realizes that P is armed, he may no longer want P to carry on with the
conduct constituting the predicate offense. He may no longer care one way or the
other whether P carries on with the deal.
On this reading the unwitting S is not liable as a § 924(c) accomplice because
the actus reus and mens rea required for complicity fail to concur. The unwitting
S satisfies the actus reus for accomplice liability (he continues to provide aid or
encouragement to P), and he satisfies one mental state required for such liability
(he knows that P is armed). But he lacks another required mental state: He no
longer wants P to engage in the conduct constituting the predicate offense.
Lacking a required mental state, he lacks complicity. No requirement of "advance
knowledge" is needed to reach this result.
But now suppose the unwitting S believes the only way to avoid getting
himself or someone else killed is for P to finish the deal. His realization that P is
armed would leave intact his desire for P to finish the deal. His reason for wanting
P to carry on has changed. Maybe he wanted the deal to go through before he
learned about the gun because he wanted whatever benefit he was supposed to get
as a result. Having learned about the gun he now wants the deal to go through
because (we are assuming) he sees no other way to avoid greater harm. His only
defense will therefore be an affirmative one, and as Justice Alito observed, the
most likely candidates will be necessity or duress.
58
continued participation is the only way to avoid such harm. See id. at 1251 ("finishing the sale might
be the best or only way to avoid [a greater harm]") (emphasis added). Justice Alito missed it too.
58 Justice Alito's opinion can be read to suggest that the only "practical" difference between
affording the unwitting S an affirmative defense or a failure of proof defense is that the defendant
bears the burden of proving the former and the government bears the burden of disproving the latter
(i.e., the burden of proving the elements of the offense). The underlying standard is the same. The
defendant would need to prove that he chose the lesser harm, or the government would need to prove
that he chose a greater harm.
That suggestion would be misleading. The majority opinion requires the government to prove
that S wanted P to carry on with the predicate offense, i.e., it requires proofofa mental state. Justice
Alito would require the defense to prove the elements constituting the defenses of necessity or duress.
The evidence used to discharge one burden might overlap with that used to discharge the other, but
the objects of proof are analytically distinct. Although neither defense has been codified in federal
law, nor has the Supreme Court yet provided an authoritative statement of the elements of either
defense, here are some doctrinal obstacles an unwitting S might face when he tries to raise a necessity
or duress defense that he wouldn't face if he tried to raise a failure of proof defense.
First, if necessity is available only "where physical forces beyond the actor's control rendered
illegal conduct the lesser of two evils," United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 410 (1980) (dicta)
(emphasis added), what "physical forces" render the unwitting S's conduct the lesser evil? Second, if
duress is available only if the defendant commits the crime "under an unlawful and imminent threat.
• . of death or serious bodily injury," Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1, 5 n.2 (2006) (dicta)
(emphasis added), what if no one ever "threatened" the unwitting S? Third, if neither defense is
available if the defendant "recklessly or negligently placed" himself in the situation giving rise to the
claim of necessity or duress, id. (dicta), won't the government be quick to emphasize the fact that the
unwitting S got himself into trouble in the first place because he wanted P to commit the § 924(c)
predicate offense?
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Again, no real disagreement exists between the majority and Justice Alito.
Both agree that S is not liable as a § 924(c) accomplice, unless at the time S
provides aid or encouragement to P he knows that P is or will be armed. They
disagree on what else is going on in the mind of the unwitting S. The majority
imagines an unwitting S who continues to provide aid because he believes that P's
going through with the deal is the best way to avoid greater harm but no longer
wants P to go through with the deal. The majority's unwitting S thus lacks a
mental state needed to render him complicit. Justice Alito imagines an unwitting S
who continues to provide aid because he believes that P's going on with the deal is
the only way to avoid greater harm and so wants P to go through with the deal.
Justice Alito's unwitting S satisfies all the elements needed to render him
complicit. His only way out is an affirmative defense. 59
Neither side is wrong. It all depends on what happens in S's mind when he
realizes P is packing. An unwitting S should have both defenses available to him.
If he can prove he no longer wanted P to proceed, the government will have failed
to carry its prima facie case. If he wanted P to carry on despite his new-found
knowledge, he can still prevail if he satisfies the elements of an affirmative
defense.
CONCLUSION
The Court in Rosemond faithfully answered the question presented and in so
doing settled some of the issues surrounding the requirements under § 2 for
liability as a § 924(c) accomplice. But Rosemond left the most pressing question
open. We still can't say with any precision just what in general the government
must show was going on in the mind of one person in order to punish himfor the
criminal wrongs of another. We shouldn't fault the Court for leaving that question
unresolved. For one thing it wasn't (immediately) presented. For another the
59 Justice Alito believed the majority's analysis confused intent and motive (or ulterior intent).
The majority (according to Justice Alito) believed that an unwitting S who continues to provide aid
because he wants to avoid a greater harm (his motive) doesn't really want P to carry on with the
predicate offense and so lacks the intent (understood as purpose) for him to carry on. But (as Justice
Alito rightly said) the "intent to undertake some act is of course perfectly consistent with the motive
of avoiding adverse consequences which would otherwise occur." Rosemond, 134 S. Ct. at 1255.
The majority denied the charge. See id. at 1251 n.10. So far as I can tell the two sides are again
talking past one another.
If S wants to avoid a greater harm and believes the only way to achieve that end is for P to
carry on then he will necessarily intend (have as his purpose) that P carry on. Far from negating any
intent for P to carry on, S's motive rationally entails that intent. P's carrying on is a necessary means
to S's end. All S can therefore do is advance an affirmative defense. The charge that the majority
has confused motive and intent might thus be defensible. But if S wants to avoid a greater harm and
believes the best (but not the only) way to achieve that end is for P to carry on then he may or may
not intend that P carry on. P's carrying on is not a necessary means to S's end. S can therefore
advance a failure of proof defense. The charge that the majority has confused motive and intent
would thus be unfounded.
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answer might turn out to be that the question makes no sense. Maybe nothing can
make one person responsible for the misdeeds of another.6°
60 See Husak, supra note 12, at 57 ("[N]o analysis of the conditions under which the act of the
principal can be attributed to the aider will turn out to be defensible.").
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